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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
VAN D. SCOTT 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920702CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a conviction on the charge of theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code annotated 76-6-404 
and, Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
annotated 76-6-202 with an enhancement to a habitual criminal under 
Utah Code annotated 76-8-1001, rendered by a jury impaneled before 
the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde. Jurisdiction to hear the above 
entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code annotated, 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendant's guilt 
of theft, where their was no evidence that the Defendant took 
control or had on his possession any of the personal property taken 
from the establishment burglarized by the Defendant. 
2. If the Defendant was not guilty of theft, a second degree 
felony, then the Court errored in enhancing the sentence to a 
habitual criminal, with a minimum sentence on said enhancement of 
a minimum of five years, and which may be for life. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404, UCA. 
1. A person commits theft if he obtains or exercise 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-202, UCA. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-8-1001, UCA. 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses having 
been at least a second degree felony or a crime which, if committed 
within this state would have been a capital felony, first degree 
felony, or second degree felony, and was committed to any prison 
may, upon conviction of at least a second degree felony committed 
in this state, other than aggravated murder or murder, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on the charges of 
aggravated theft, a second degree felony,and burglary, a third 
degree felony with enhancement to a habitual criminal following a 
jury trial before the Honorable Judge Ronald 0. Hyde on the 25th 
day of February, 1991. Defendant was sentenced on the charge on 
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the 25th day of February 1991 to serve a term in the Utah State 
Prison for the burglary of not to exceed five (5) , and on the charge 
of theft, together with the finding that the Defendant is with*the 
status of a habitual criminal to a term of not less than five years 
and may be for life, at the Utah State Prison, all sentences to run 
concurrently. 
The Defendant filed for post conviction relief requesting that 
he be granted an appeal which was received by the Clerk of the 
Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah on the 22th 
day of October, 1992. 
This appeal, which was directed to the Court of Appeals for 
the State of Utah, for which, on the 22nd day of October 1992, 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Court of Appeals, filed a 
certificate on Appeal No. 920702CA on the 28th day of October, 
1992. 
That on the 2nd day of December 1992 the Defendant's attorney 
John T. Caine signed the affidavit of Iitipecuniosity which was filed 
with the Clerk of Weber County, and that counsel, John T. Caine, 
was appointed to represent the Defendant as the result of the 
Defendant's motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in 
this appeal which was received by the Clerk of the District Court 
of Weber County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the evening of the 26th day of September 1990 a business 
entitled the Gift House, a sporting goods store and pawnshop at 120 
25th Street in Ogden, County of Weber, Utah was burglarized, a 
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jewelry display case was broken into, and various items of jewelry 
valued in excess of $1,000 was taken from the premises without the 
consent of the owner. The premises had a burglar alarm that was 
wired directly to the police department, which burglar alarm was 
activated after the owner left the premises at approximately 7:15 
p.m. When the owner arrived at his house he was informed that 
somebody had kicked in the front door of the business. At the time 
the owner returned to the business address he found the front door 
latch had been broken and there were various police officer at the 
business. Upon entering the premises it was noticed that the 
jewelry case was smashed in and substantial jewelry was scattered 
on the floor. Also there was a lot of blood on the floor. 
There was a blood trail that led from the business across 25th 
street, down to Wall Avenue, behind the American Legion building on 
Wall Avenue, across Wall Ave and eastbound onto Doxey Street, where 
the Defendant was located in a vacant field at approximately 132 
Doxey Street. The Defendant had cut himself on his left wrist. 
After the Defendant's arrest, he was taken to McKay Dee 
Hospital emergency ward to sew up the cut on his wrist. The 
Defendant admitted to Officer Clements of the Ogden City Police 
Department that he was with another individual named Charles 
Booker. That Charles Booker kicked in the door of the gift house, 
but the Defendant smashed the jewelry case glass, where he received 
his cut. That the Defendant did not take any of the jewelry, but 
Charles Booker took all of the jewelry which was missing from the 
premises. (Tp. 84-5). At no time was any jewelry located on the 
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presence of or at any residence controlled by the Defendant. (Tp. 
85-6) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence of Defendant's involvement was insufficient to 
demonstrate his guilt of theft. Given the circumstances involved 
in this case where the Defendant only admitted smashing the jewelry 
case, but denys taking any jewelry and no jewelry was found on his 
presence or otherwise in his control casts doubt as to the evidence 
necessary to find him guilty of theft. If the Defendant is not 




THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THEFT 
The standard established for an Appellate review of the 
sufficiency of evidence is well established. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
"It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the 
facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the lines 
most favorable to the verdict; and that if when so 
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the Defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt the verdict will not be disturbed." 
Citing case State vs Ward, 347 P. 2d 865, 869 (1959 footnote 
omitted.) 
The Utah State Supreme Court has held in State vs Booker, 709 
P.2d, 342 Utah 1985: 
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"That we review the evidence and all inferences which may 
be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted". 
See also State vs McCardell, 652 P.2d, 942 (Utah 1982), 
State vs Martinez. 709 P.2d, 355 (Utah 1985). However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to stretch the 
inference beyond gaps in the evidence as in the case of 
State vs Petree, 659 P.2d, 443,444 (Utah 1983), where the Court 
said: 
"Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's 
decision this Court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The 
fabric of evidence against the Defendant must cover the 
gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of 
guilt." 
The Defendant was convicted of theft and burglary with an 
enhancement as a habitual criminal. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404, UCA.provides as follows: 
1. A person commits theft if he obtains or exercise 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
To find the Defendant guilty of the crime of theft the jury 
had to find: 
(1) that defendant solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged, or intentionally aided another person to 
obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property 
of another;(2) that he did so intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly: (3) that the property did belong to 
another; (4) that defendant the purpose at that time to 
deprive the owner of said property; and (5) that the 
value of the said property exceeded $1,000, or that one 
of the actors was armed with a deadly weapon, or that the 
property was stolen from the person of another." 
State v. Smith 706 P2nd 1052, 1056 
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In the present case the evidence fails to show that the Defendant 
took any unauthorized control over the property of the gift house. 
In fact, the Defendant did not admit that he had any intention of 
taking the property of the Gift House, when he admitted that he had 
entered without permission the premises of the Gift House with 
Charles Booker. Further no officer or any other witness at the 
trial testified nor was there any evidence presented that the 
Defendant ever had on his possession or in his control any property 
of the victim, the Gift House. (Tp. 84-90) Further, prior to the 
burglary, the owner of the Gift House , Mr. Van Leeuwen testified 
that although he knew the Defendant he did not identify him as one 
of the two individuals he had seen loitering around the store when 
he left the store prior to the burglary. (Tp. 27-28) 
There was no evidence presented to the jury that the Defendant 
solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided 
Charles Booker to obtain possession of the property of the Gift 
House. Further, their was no evidence that the Defendant intended 
to deprived the Gift House of the ownership of said property, which 
finding is requisite to convicting him of the crime of theft. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 7th Circuit ruled 
in Webster vs Duckworth, 767 F.2d, 1206, (1985),: 
"That the absence of competence substantive evidence to 
support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whether the result of prosecutorial inability, judicial 
error or recalcitrant witness requires acquittal either 
at trial or on appeal." 
The Supreme Court of Washington considered this general rule in the 
case of State vs Allen, 574 P.2d, 1182, (1978) where the Court 
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ruled that: 
"Doubt of guilt cannot co-exist with conviction of guilt; 
any fact in evidence may, under particular circumstances, 
raise doubt of guilt which would not otherwise exist, if 
doubt is raised, it follows that jury is not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt of Defendant and must 
acquit." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah confirmed the 
Defendant's theory in the case of State vs Mecham, 456 P.2d 156, 
(1969); where although the Court affirmed the Defendant's 
conviction, the Court indicated that: 
"Not withstanding the fact that exact date of indecent 
assault was never made a particular issue at the trial by 
notice of alibi or otherwise, except as witnesses were 
questioned as to what happened on that date, State had 
the burden to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and this evidence of Defendant's being elsewhere 
was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his 
being involved in the crime, he should be acquitted." 
The Court is clear in its assertion that in such a case the 
Defendant is to be acquitted. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be used in Utah 
regarding sufficiency of the evidence in State vs Romero, 554 P.2d, 
216, 1976: 
"The status is of the standard for determining 
sufficiency of evidence is whether it is so inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not 
reasonably believe the Defendant had committed a crime." 
In the present case the jury gave unreasonable weight to the 
fact that the Defendant admitted he was on the premises to convict 
him of the crime of theft, without any evidence to show his guilt 
thereof. 
The Defendant defends his position with the basic rule that a 
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conviction wi thout evidence of guilt cl early violates his rights to 
due process of I aw. 
Tl le Defc • - * 
Supreme Court in Sandstrom vs Montana, - ' . • • , * ? • - , 
the Court ruled that ]nt:] ' may not be instructed that: 
"The law presumes that a person in 
consequences of his voluntary acts." 
Because ut t lio l-llii Amendment Due n o c e b b requ i r. eittenn , lii.it 
the State must prove eaci *•'.:• clement ^ i defense beyond a 
• • ' ." i resumption conflicts 
with the stronge. ,-., .<*:-. . ximg presumptioi nnocence, which 
everyone accused : offense is entitled 
T - II III t h e i a s e i if 
Utah vs Walton, •:• * - - • (1982) ** Defendant argues tliat: 
this line r* i«^?
 r •'•••'-
;i
 -, . - *-iMr*on5- - • • - in the current 
case, wher e tl le Defendar it :i s i i :: • t: c ] e a r 1 y :i cieiit i f i e< I a s a 
perpetrator of the theft and that, therefore, the jury i s bei i lg 
expected tc presume that because he was oi i the premises he was 
guilty of the theft Si I : 1 I a presumption w :i thout ai i;;r c:i :i mi : = :  • t 
ev i dence i s c 1 e a r 1 y v i o 1 a t i v e o f t h e De f endan t s r igh t t o • iii e 
process. 
POINT II 
Enhanced Sentence as a Habitual Criminal 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ENHANCING 
THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE AS 
A HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
To enhanced the sentence f the Defendant the Trial Judge must 
rely on. Vn« mnvintinn .. ii | lie 
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Defendant was not guilty of the crime of theft then he was not 
convicted of a second degree felony as required by Section 76-8-
1001 UCA and therefore his sentence was in error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant Van D. Scott was improperly charged and 
convicted of theft in violation of the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Defendant 
alleges that the jury convicted him on no substantial evidence that 
he in fact committed this crime of theft, and that the evidence 
presented at trial cast doubt on whether he was involved in the 
crime of theft. Further if he is not guilty of theft, then he can 
not be sentenced as a habitual criminal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thj^//A day o#?May, 1993. 
:AINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid 
this l&t? day of May, 1993. 
iN^yCAINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
Q •_• ,. . SYSTEMS, MOST OF --
A THAT' ;i DRRECT. 
Q MOST •••'- •' ': ': •• •  > TliFKK Al,i, IMI.II'I. 
NOW, .:.'• . DECARIA MADE A POINT A 
MOMENT AGO < r HAVING YOU POINT • • T MF« . bCOTT AS SOMEONE WHO' i 
B E E N . ) • - • - II II! • 
EXI i 'EOPLE r. ..*-.: v OMb '- STORE A 
MINIMUM, ; •• < v 
A THAT'S CORREC . 
0 PEOPLE COME IN YOUR STORE. 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q I MAY HAVE . : . Ml<. Sl'UBBS, MANY 
OTHERS IN THIS COURTROOM, . S :'.- K:(;;i'i? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q ANP YOU IIIDII'T SKI'1 THAT MIGHT MR. SCOTT IN YOUR STORE 
NO. 
OMMITTING MURGLAR' I' 'I'M iKA^i 
N O , 
O K A ' ' '•"• ! ' '• • - .- i 
iJRl'1.. ..i.jN ;..-Jk Lr'AV ING *E STORE, 
ANf .- ATTENTION *••: : *AWN u ''iKr, i >'l DIDN"T DENTIFY 
!EITHER ONE 
NO, SIR, I. DID NOT. 








' i. .:r W «-•'•. "BN, ARE YOU CERTAIN 
I .'hr A UNDERS . , E YOU CERTAIN 
' -• - THERE WERE TWO? 
YH:.:, SIR. 
NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. AND THEY WERE WHAT, WITHIN 100 
YARDS OR SO OF THE STORE WHEN YOU SAW THEM? 
THEY WERE WITHIN — 
CLOSER THAN THAT? 
; YES, THEY WERE CLOSER THAN THAT. MAYBE WITHIN A COUPLE 
HUNDRED l-'EET nb' TDK STORE. 
V ALTHOUGH YOU WERE SOMEWHAT TAKEN BY THEIR PRESENCE, 
APPARENTLY YOU WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED TO GO BACK AND 
WATCH THEM TO SEE WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO. 
A NO. 
Q ' "ATEMENT? 
A (WITNESS NODS.) 
Q AND THAT AGAIN, YOU INDICATED ONE • -HEM WAS URINATING 
I HlM.AUliK 'I'M'" • WAS 
MOT S. UNUSUA , SEEING THAT. 
WEI - > i^Ouui i THAT ^ 
A '«* .- "HFY NORMALLY DON'T URINATE IN THE FRONT DOOR 
'F - "• NESb. 







1 II I ' M GOING TO TALK TO YOU, I -•• L E T ' S MAKE A DE7.7 ' 7 0 L ~ TJ..M 
2 || WK CAN MAKK NO UKA!,, 1 DUN' T HAVE AUTHORIT " ' M-\r •• 
i II AND THEN I ASKED HIM I F HE S T I L L WISHED TO 
SAYS, YM \;t TALK TO YOU. 
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LESSER OFFENSE DEAL. . r ..-. LESSER 
OFFENSE. 
HE ALSO --HE ALSO WANTED TO TALK TO DETECTIVE SOAKAI 
CONCERNING SOME DRUG PEOPLE HE COULD GIVE UP, HE COULD TURN 
1 S O A K M C . 
OKAY. HE T mHAT TO YOTT 
YES. 
— AT THE 'I' I MI-:.' I :;KI','. Ilf n V' >U hi A; II IM SI'KC I !•' h ' 
i 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT I JF ' D DONE THAT PARTICULAR NIGHT OR DID 
1b •• " ! F EM TELL YOU AIN • - -
1 7
 A JUST MORE OR LESS LET HIM TELI, ME. 
1
" Q WHAT DID HE SAY? 
A HI ' MA.'I l ( ' A I , [ , 7 I ' .A l l ' 
THE NAME OF CHARLES OUT .»•-,, .. .' . • •: HOUSE. 
OTHER BLACK MALE WHOSE NAME WAS CHARLES KICKEE :TE -i -
I JSK HOOP. THAT HE V -l\ NLSa wuri '. • • iARLES, 
AND HE SMASHED OUT THE JEWELRY WINDOW INSIDE THE BUSINESS. 
THAT HE 








VAN HI IV'' 
V k.', , '',', 11 
I S E E . O K * 
A N D T H A T HH 
>•- I w:7'-m "APPENED? 
• !' NO! ;-K -NYTHING, THAT CHARLES TOOK 
EVERYTHING AND 
Q DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH HIM .•<. P ANY OTHER TIME? 
A III i 
Q W A u inAi T H K 
PARTICULAR NIGHT TO YOU? 
A '•'"• . I TRIED TO GET HIM TO ADMIT TO TAKING THE PROPERTY, 
WHICH HE DENIED. 
Q NOW, YOU TESTIFIED IN A HEARING ON THIS MATTER BEFORE? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q HAVE YOU TE.-. ! TFIED AT TRIAL ON AN INDIVIDUAL h V THK NAME 
OF CHARLES BOOKER? 
A 
Q '" THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS CHARGED WITH 
THE OFFENSE RELATED TO THIS? 
A S. 
Q AND WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME OF THAT TRIAL? 
A uUNu u 
Q TP vr>T . , , • WAS 



























fA NO, I DIDN'T. THE" ONLY THING I FOUND WAS WHEN I WAS 
FOLLOWING THE BLOOD TRAIL ALONG WALL, I FOUND A RING HOLDER, 
FELT TYPE, BLACK RING HOLDER. I FELT — SAW THAT DOWN ALONG 
THE BLOOD TRAIL PROBABLY ABOUT IN THE 2600 BLOCK OF WALL AREA. 
Q DID YOU PICK THAT UP? 
A YES, I DID. BUT WHEN I WAS UP TO THE HOSPITAL, I 
PERSONALLY MISPLACED IT. I DID NOT GET IT INTO EVIDENCE. 
Q OKAY. WERE THERE RINGS IN IT? . 
A NO. I HOPE NOT. 
Q OKAY. DID ANYONE ELSE IN YOUR PRESENCE SPEAK TO VAN 
SCOTT? 
A YES. DETECTIVE STUBBS AND DETECTIVE SOAKAI. 
Q YOU WERE PRESENT WHEN DETECTIVE STUBBS SPOKE TO HIM? 
A NOT WHEN HE BOOKED HIM, NO. 
Q OKAY. WHEN HE SPOKE TO HIM, THOUGH, YOU WERE PRESENT AT 
THE HOSPITAL? 
A AT THE HOSPITAL. 
Q I SEE. I WAS STANDING OUTSIDE THE -- THEIR LITTLE CUBBY, 
EMERGENCY ROOM AREA WHEN HE WAS IN THERE TALKING TO HIM. IT 
HAS JUST A CURTAIN IN FRONT OF IT, AND YOU COULD HEAR WHAT WAS 
BEING SAID INSIDE. 
Q OKAY. THE OTHER CLOTHES THAT VAN SCOTT WAS WEARING ON 
THAT PARTICULAR NIGHT, WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE? 
A I SURRENDERED THEM TO OFFICER THOMAS, TECH SERVICES, TO 



























j]_Q OKAY-, H^E- OTHER CLOTHES ALONG WITH THE SHIRT? 
A YEAH. THERE WAS A PAIR OF BRITISH KNIGHT TYPE TENNIS 
SHOES, BLUE JEANS, AND THAT'S — 
Q DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO LOOK AT THE TENNIS SHOES 
THEMSELVES? 
A YES. 
Q DID HE BLEED ON THEM, TOO? 
A YEAH, BUT IT WAS QUITE OBVIOUS IT WAS HIS BLOOD BECAUSE 
HE WAS DRIPPING ON IT AS WE WERE WATCHING HIM. 
Q HE WAS DRIPPING BLOOD ON HIS SHOES? 
A YES. 
MR. DECARIA: OKAY. I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CAINE: 
Q WERE THOSE SHOES EVER TAKEN AND SENT TO THE WEBER STATE 
CRIME LAB — 
A I DON'T — 
Q — TO BE MATCHED WITH THE OTHER BLOOD THAT WAS FOUND AT 
THE SCENE? 
A I HAVE NO IDEA. 
Q OKAY. YOU DIDN'T DO IT? 
A NO, SIR. 
Q OKAY. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO WHAT YOU FOUND, BASICALLY, 
MR. SCOTT TOLD YOU THAT HE DIDN'T TAKE ANY JEWELRY. 



























fU AND YOUR PHYSICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF HIM AS YOU 
FOUND HIM THAT NIGHT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT; YOU DIDN'T FIND 
HIM WITH ANY JEWELRY. 
A THAT'S TRUE, SIR. 
Q IS THAT RIGHT? AND THAT WAS HIS STATEMENT TO YOU, HE 
ADMITTED THAT HE WAS INSIDE, ADMITTED HE FORCED HIS WAY IN, 
ADMITTED HE BROKE THE CASE. 
A YES. 
Q RIGHT? BUT SAID HE DIDN'T TAKE THE JEWELRY. 
A YES. 
Q SOMEBODY ELSE DID. 
A YES, SIR. 
Q SOMEONE NAMED CHARLES. 
Q YES. 
Q AND YOU LATER LEARNED THAT THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS CHARLES 
BOOKER. 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND DID YOU ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATION OF MR. BOOKER? 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q DID YOU -- DID YOU PLAY ANY ROLE IN THAT FROM BEYOND THAT 
POINT? 
A JUST THE PART WHERE I — FROM THE INFORMATION THAT WAS 
GIVEN TO ME FROM MR. SCOTT, IT HELPED ME DETERMINE THAT IT WAS 
CHARLES BOOKER THAT WAS INVOLVED. 



























A AND I TESTIFIED IN COURT IN HIS TRIAL TO THAT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, YOU'VE TOLD THE JURY THAT MR. BOOKER WAS 
CONVICTED IN A TRIAL OF THESE CHARGES, IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q ARE YOU AWARE OF ALL OF THE OTHER EVIDENCE THAT WAS 
PRESENTED IN THAT TRIAL CONNECTING MR. BOOKER TO THE THEFT OF 
THE JEWELRY? 
A NO, SIR. 
Q ALL RIGHT. SO ALL YOU DID IS, YOU TESTIFIED AND YOU KNOW 
ABOUT THE VERDICT, BUT IN TERMS OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT 
EVIDENCE THAT JURY HEARD, YOU DON'T KNOW. 
A THAT'S TRUE. 
Q NOW, WITH RESPECT TO MR. SCOTT'S DISCUSSION WITH YOU, YOU 
INDICATED INITIALLY HE WANTED TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT A LESSER 
CHARGE OR MAKE SOME KIND OF A DEAL. YOU MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM, 
I GUESS, THAT YOU WOULDN'T MAKE A DEAL WITH HIM. 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q AND EVEN AFTER YOU MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM, HE TALKED TO 
YOU? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND SO YOUR VIEW IS AT THAT POINT HE WAS TALKING TO YOU 
VOLUNTARILY AND HE KNEW HE WASN'T MAKING A STATEMENT IN ORDER 
TO GET A DEAL, IS THAT A FAIR ASSUMPTION? 
A THAT'S A FAIR EVALUATION. 




























Q AND KNOWING ALL OF THAT, MR. SCOTT TELLS YOU THAT HE WAS 
WITH AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED CHARLES, THEY BROKE INTO THE GIFT 
HOUSE, BUT THAT THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL TOOK THE JEWELRY. 
A YES, SIR. 
Q RIGHT? AND NONE OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT YOU HAD 
WITH HIM AT THE TIME WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THAT STORY, RIGHT? 
A THAT'S TRUE. 
MR. CAINE: THANK YOU. THAT'S ALL. 
MR. DECARIA: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: THAT'S ALL, SIR. THANK YOU. 
MR. DECARIA: I'LL HAVE ALBERT TAYLOR COME FORWARD. 
MR. CAINE: NO OBJECTION IF THIS DETECTIVE NEEDS TO 
BE EXCUSED. 
MR. DECARIA: NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: FINE. 
ALBERT TAYLOR, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DECARIA: 
Q STATE YOUR FULL NAME FOR THE RECORD PLEASE. 
A ALBERT W. TAYLOR. 
Q WHERE DO YOU LIVE, MR. TAYLOR? 
A 140 - 28TH STREET, APARTMENT NUMBER NINE. 
